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State right-to-work laws, the subject of considerable controversy in the 
industrial relations field, typically state that no person will be required 
to become a union member or, conversely, be required to abstain from 
union membership as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment. 
Little hard evidence exists on the effect of right-to-work laws. Meyers 
(1955) concludes that in Texas the law does not appear to have had a 
noticeable impact on union strength. Kuhlman (1955) finds that the 
Virginia law has caused little change in hiring practices, and he cites lack 
of enforcement as a major cause. Kovit (1969), in examining Indiana as 
the only state to pass a right-to-work law and subsequently repeal it, 
argues that the law was ineffective because unions found ways to 
circumvent its restrictions. During the period 1957-65 when the law was 
in force in Indiana, there was a dramatic increase in the agency shop 
which allows nonunion workers but which requires all employees to pay 
union dues. A Fortune (1957) survey of employers and union leaders in 
states with right-to-work laws concluded that the laws had little effect on 
overall union strength. In many states the laws were not being enforced, 
and in some instances employers were unwilling or unable to avoid 
de facto union shops. For example, in Arizona it was reported that the 
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attempt to hire a nonunion worker resulted in the union labor force 
calling in sick. Similarly, in Nevada, South Carolina, South Dakota, and 
Iowa, the survey found that unions were able to maintain union shop 
pr<1ctices in spite of legislation to the contrary. One :'\orth Dakota 
legislator expressed his frustration by remarking, "It's a beneficial law to 
have, but there is no specific use for it right now" (Fortune 1957, p. 236). 
In this paper we pursue the question of the effect of right-to-work laws 
beyond the impressionistic and fragmented evidence just cited and 
attempt to determine whether such laws significantly affect union 
membership. Since measuring the impact of right-to-work laws neces-
sitates holding "other things" constant, a sccondary product of this study 
is the assessment of the effect of other variables on union membership. 
I. A Model of the Supply and Delll.and for Union Services 
In this section ,\'e develop a simple theoretical model of the determinants 
of union m{,!lIbership by state. Following the approach of Pencavel 
i 1971,1. Wt· vicw the purchase of union membership as the result of 
utility-maximizing decision on the part of the indi"idual worker. 
Spccifically. mcmbership is conceived as one of a number of forms in 
which the \\orkl'l' Illa,' choose to hold \\'Calth. The clecision to join a union 
as opposed to investing in another form of wealth can thus be analyzed 
using the standard theory of consumer choice. Consumer demand for an 
asset yielding services over a period of time is assumed a function of the 
indi,'idual's income (1'), price (P), the return of the asset relative to 
alternative assets (R), and a vector of tastes and preferences of the 
worker (T . In general, 
( I ) 
On the supply side, in the absence of a f()rmal model, we assume that 
the Icvcl of unioll services provided is a function of the price of union 
mcmbership and the costs of providing services. Costs include not only 
factor costs but also costs imposed by go,'Crnment policY, legislation 
concerning unions, and any real or psychological costs imposed by union 
leadership or rank-and-file members themselves, such as resistance to 
working with minority groups, Thus, the supply of union services can be 
written as 
(2) 
where C is a vector of variahles \\'hieh determine the cost of providing 
union services. If the equilibrium condition of the market for union 
services (C~ = ['0 C) is imposed on the model, then equa tions (I) and 
(2) can be written 
[ , ( I 'I 
(2') 
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Equations (I') and (2') form a system of two equations in two unknowns, 
P and U. The system can be solved for the optimal values, P * and [J*. 
This is equivalent to deriving the reduced form of the model and results 
in two equations, each a function of all of the exogenous variables in the 
system. In that we are concerned only with the equilibrium level of union 
services, subsequent analysis is confined to the reduced-form equation 
U = U(Y, C, R, T). (3) 
II. Data RequireIllents 
Transformation of the theoretical model of section I to an empirically 
estimable form necessitates an interpret,1tion of the model in terms of the 
objectives of this paper, that is, measuring the effects of right-to-work laws 
and other variables on unionism in the United States. The observations 
in this study consist of data on the 48 states (Alaska and Hawaii are 
excluded because of data limitations) at a point in time. (In that the 
conventional interpretation of such cross sections is that of measuring an 
equilibrium relationship, we shall assume the equilibrium condition 
specified in eq. 13] holds in analyzing our data.) 
The dependent variable is the percentage of the nonagricultural work 
force unionized. Because the model is derived in terms of the level of union 
services, a transition has to be made. This is accomplished by viewing one 
unit of union services as that quantity accruing to each union member 
and assuming that the quality of services does not vary systematically 
between states. The total union services consumed in a state are 
equivalent, therefore, to the number of union members in a state. The 
percentage unionized can then be interpreted as per capita consumption 
of union services. 
Biannual union membership by state has been provided by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics since 1964. The only source of similar data for any 
previous year is provided for 1939 and 1953 by Troy (195 7). His data are 
not exactly comparable to the BLS data and probably underrepresent 
independent unions, especially in 1939. Because of the comparability 
problem, caution must be exercised in comparing the results of esti-
mations using the Troy data with estimates based 011 the BLS information. 
Along with 1939 and 1953 Troy data, 1968 BLS (1970) data were 
used. These data were the most recent available, and the choice of year 
provided relatively equal time intervals, 1939--53 and 1953-68. Table 1 
summarizes union membership by state for the 3 years. 
The income variable chosen is median wage and salary income in the 
state for the closest census year. Since most of the total income of union 
members is derived from wages and salaries, it will be assumed that the 
exelusion of othtT income will not introduce significant measurement 
bias. 
Adequate data on the rate of return on alternative forms of wealth held 
TABLE 1 
UNION MEMBERSHIP AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
NONAGRICULTCRAL \YORK FORCE BY STATE, 
1939,1953, AND 1968 
State 1939 1953 
Alabama · . · . ... . ... . 16.1 24.9 
Alaska. . .. · . · . ... . . . · . · . i'iA* NA 
Arizona · . 16.6 27.7 
Arkansas. · . · . · . 12.7 21.5 
California " . . .. '" . · . 23.4 35.7 
Colorado · . · . .. , . 17.6 27.8 
Connecticut . . . . . . . 11.3 26.5 
Delaware · . .. . ... . · . .. . 7.8 18.4 
Florida ... . ... .. . 11.3 16.2 
Georgia .. . · . . .. 7.0 15.0 
Hawaii · . · . .. NA NA 
Idaho · . · . . .. " . 13.7 21.5 
Illinois ... . .. 25.9 39.7 
Indiana · . · . · . 21.7 40.0 
Iowa ... · . .. . 17.3 25.0 
Kansas " . · . 13.4 23.9 
Kentucky . . · . " . · . 22.5 25.0 
Louisiana · . · . · . 9.6 19." 
l\lainc - . · . · . 7.2 21.4 
Marvland + \Vashington, D.C. . 12.0 25.2 
l\las~achusctts · . ... 15.S 30.1 
~Iichigan · . · . 20.0 43.3 
jylinnesota · . . .. · . 24.8 38.1 
Mississippi · . · . · . . .. 6.5 14.7 
Missouri · . · . · . 21.9 39.7 
:\loI\talla · . · . · . ... 36.7 47.0 
Nebraska · . IV; 19.7 
Nevada · . · . · . · . 18.2 30.4 
Ne\v Hampshire .. . .... 7.3 24.6 
New Jersey. If;. 1 35.2 
New Mexico ... . .. '" . · . 11.2 14.2 
New York .. . · . · . 23.0 34.4 
North Carolina · . · . 4.2 8.3 
North Dakota · . . .. . .. 10.9 15.6 
Ohio " . " . · . · . 24.4 38.0 
Oklahoma · . · . · . 10.4 16.1 
Oregon · . · . · . .... . ... 30.1 43.1 
Pennsyh'ania .. . · . · . 27.6 39.9 
Rhode Island · . 10.2 27.4 
South Carolina · . · . .. . 4.0 9.3 
South Dakota · . · . · . · . 7.1 14.4 
Tennessee ... · . · . 15.3 22.6 
Texas .. · . . ... · . · . 10.3 16.7 
Utah ... · . · . . .. 19.3 2G.3 
\7crnlont. · . . .. . . 11.4 18.9 
Virginia · . " . · . · . · . 12.8 17.4 
\Yashington ... .. . " . .. . 41.3 53.3 
\Vest Virginia · . .. . · . . .... 41.7 44.1 
\ \'isconsin · . . .. · . · . 29.1 38.3 
Wyoming. . .. 26.7 28.6 





















































SOl'l{CJ<.s. Troy (l~F)7) [or 19Y) and 195:1; C.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(1970) foe 1~)6B. 
*:\ot available. 
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by union members arc not available. However, any potential sizable 
differences in the rate of return to assets between states should be 
eliminated by the flow of funds between states. Accordingly, the rate of 
return on alternative assets is assumed not to vary between states and is 
incorporated into a constant term of the estimating equation. 
The cost of providing union services is probably subject to economies 
of scale. Once the basic structure of a union has been established in a 
given locale or industry, the marginal cost of serving an additional 
employee is small. We take the differences in cost between states to be 
most closely related to the scale of union operations in the state and the 
costs of adding new members and communicating with present members. 
The scale is proxied by the composition of industry in a given state. 
Mining, manufacturing, construction, and transportation-public utilities 
all have greater than 50 percent of their members unionized nationally, 
while wholesale and retail trade, services, government, and finance are 
substantially less organized. It is assumed that the average cost of 
providing union services is lower in those industries which have become 
highly unionized. Thus, the percentage of workers in mining, manu-
facturing, construction, and transportation-public utilities is included as 
proxies for cost. (As a practical matter, mining and manufacturing are 
combined because some states do not report them separately.) 
If union leaders arc prejudiced against the inclusion of certain groups 
in their movement and/or if workers are reluctant to associate with 
members of these or other groups, then the composition of the labor force 
may reflect a real or subjective difference in the cost of providing union 
services between the states. We take the percentage of nonwhites in a 
state's labor force and the percentage of females to be the most likely and 
widespread examples of discriminatory tastes. 
The final determinant of cost is that imposed by government policy. If 
right-to-work laws are effective, then they make unionism more costly by 
eliminating the power of the union to coerce nonmember workers to join 
as a condition of employment. ~1emberships which would have been 
obtained by coercion now have to be made up by persuasion. 
In the tastes and preferences vector of the demand function, we attempt 
to identify a number of the many dimensions of tastes and preferences by 
choice of variables for which data arc available. It is alleged that females 
move in and out of the labor force more frequently than do males. Thus, 
the advantages of a union to females may be less significant. In addition, 
the domination of unions by males, by reducing the chance for female 
advancement within the union, may make membership kss profitable. 
Racial minorities also are less likely to join unions because of a distaste 
for the almost exclusively white hierarchy of the union and exclusionary 
practices of w hi te mem bers. 
The industrial composition of a state may also reflect the attitudes of 
the work force toward unionisrn. Presumably, workers who choose 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
TABLE 2 
STATES WITH RIGHT-TO-\\!ORK LAWS 
AS OF 1968 
State 
Alabama ........ . 
Arizona ......... . 
Arkansas ......... . 
Florida .......... . 
Georgia ......... . 
Iowa ............ . 
Kansas .......... . 
Mississippi ....... . 
Nebraska ........ . 
Ne\"ada ......... . 
North Carolina ... . 
North Dakota .... . 
South Carolina ... . 
South Dakota .... . 
Tennessee ....... . 
Texas ........... . 
Utah ........... . 
Virginia ......... . 
"·yoming ........ . 




















SfH'RCE.-U.S. Bureau or Labor Standards 
(I!HiO,. 
:\'OTF-:. -Indialla enacted a right-ta-work bl\'\' in 
19:>7 alld repcakd it in 1965. 
employment in an industry which is highly unionized have a more 
favoralJle attitude toward unions than do workers in other professions. 
Another dimension of tastes and preferences is attitudes toward 
interference in the market mechanism. States with strong laissez-faire 
traditions are likely to view the power of the union and its infringement 
on the free market with suspicion. In that right-to-work laws arc often 
enacted by vote of the populace, the existence of a right-to-work law may 
be indicative of antiunion sentiment. Table 2 lists states with such laws. 
A better measure of tastes and preferences instead of the adoption or 
rejection of a state right-to-work law would include, first, the percentage 
of votes in a general state election for the adoption of such a law and, 
second, the degree to which the law, when in operation, was enforced in 
each state. Because such data are not readily available for a significant 
number of states, we include only adoption or nonadoption of a right-to-
work law as one of the independent variables. The inclusion of the 
variables discussed above yields (4), the final equation to be estimated: 
U = ao + at PF1;; + {/2PNW + {/3PTRAN 
+ a4 PJIM + {/sPCON + a6INCOAJE + a7RTW, (4) 
where Plf/t' and PFE arc the percentage of the work force that is nonwhite 
and female, respecti\"ely, RTTV is a dummy variable for states with 
right-to-work laws (or, in the case of the 1939 data, states that will 
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eventually adopt right-to-work laws), INCOME is median wage and 
salary income, and Pi'vIM, PCON, and PTRAN are the percentage of the 
nonagricultural work force engaged in manufacturing and mining, 
construction, and transportation~public utilities, respectively. 
The above analysis suggests that the coefficients of the income, mining 
and manufacturing, construction, and transportation~public utilities 
variables will be positive. The variables percentage nonwhite, percentage 
female, and existence of a right-to-work law are expected to be negatively 
associated with union membership. 
Of particular interest is the right-to-work variable. The estimated 
coeffieient, which represents the impact of right-to-work laws, may be 
measuring two effects. First, the passage or non passage of a law may 
reflect the tastes and prc/cTences of the population. Second, the existence 
of a right-to-work law may raise the cost of unionization. Thus, the dual 
nature of the right-to-work variable complicates the interpretation of its 
coefficient. Anv empirical investigation revealing that right-to-work laws 
are significantly negatively correlated with the extent of unionism may 
simply mean that, in states which have such laws, there is a strong bias 
against unions rather than any real antiunion effect of the law. A 
technique must he derived to separate the two effects. \Ve attempt to do 
this in the following way. The Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947, and 
Troy's data providc us with union membership by state for a prior year, 
1939, and for a later year, 1953. Although right-to-work laws were nnt 
in existencc in 1939, we used, as a proxy measure of a state's tastes and 
preferences concerning unionization in that year, the information that 13 
of the states would adopt right-to-work laws by 1953. We then estimated 
equation (4) for 1939 and 1953. For 1939, therefore, the right-to-work 
variable can reflect only tastes and preferences. For 1953, however, the 
variable will reflect not only tastes and preferences but also any effects 
which stemmed from the adoption of the right-to-work laws. If it is 
assumed that the role of the right-to-work variable as an indicator of 
tastes and preferences has not changed in the intervening period, then any 
additional impact found in 1953 must result from the effect of the laws. 
The statistical test is thus whether or not the estimated coefIicient of the 
right-to-work variable for 1953 is significantly different from that 
estimated in 1939. If the hypothesis that they are equal can be rejected, 
then evidence has been found for the impact of right-to-work laws. 
A similar test can be undertaken using 1968 data. By 1953, 13 states 
had right-to-work laws and six more adopted such laws between then and 
1968, for a total of 19 states. If we examine the coefficient of the right-
to-work variable in 1939 and in 1953, any difference reflects the impact 
of the passage of right-to-work laws if tastes and preferences are assumed 
constant. Examining the 1968 coefficient in comparison with the 1939 and 
1953 coefficients provides evidence of the effect of such laws after the 
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elapse of a substantial period of time. A finding of no right-to-work law 
effect in 1953 might be explained because the time lag was insufficient 
for their effect to become evident. A similar result for 1968, however, 
would provide a stronger case against the existence of any real effect. 
Two additional tests of the effect of right-to-work laws are made using 
the data. First, equation (4) is estimated using first differences of the data, 
that is, the change in percentage unionized between periods is regressed 
as a function of changes in the independent variables over the same 
period. If right-to-work laws have obstructed union organization, then 
the coefficient of the right-to-work dummy should be negative. 
Second, the period of time that a right-to-work law has been in force 
might be expected to be related to its impact on union membership. 
Taking the subset of states with right-to-work laws in 1968, the change 
in union membership over time in these states is regressed against the 
variables mentioned previously plus the number of years the state had 
such a law. 
III. Regression Results 
The results reported in this section are felr estima (ion of eq ua tion (4) 
using as the right-to-work variable those states adopting a right-to-work 
law by 1968. They are summarized in table 3. I The coefIicient of the 
first variable, percentage of females in the labor force, is negative in each 
of the 3 years but statistically significant 2 only in 1939. The coefficient 
of the variable, percentage of nonwhites in the labor force, is positive in 
1939 and 1953 but not statistically significant in any year. 
States with a higher proportion of workers engaged in transportation 
and public utilities are, ceteris paribus, more highly unionized, as expected. 
The coefficient of this variable is significant in 1939 and 1968. Positive 
and significant coefficients are also found for variable 4, percentage of the 
labor force in mining and manu£,cturing in 1939 and 1968. III 1953, the 
estimated coefficient is negative but not significant. 
An unexpected finding is that the percentage of workers in construction 
is inversely related to unionization. The coefficient is negative for all 3 
years and significant in 1968. A possible explanation is that, while the 
majority of construction workers are unionized, those states which have 
above-average employment in construction have a significantly larger 
1 Regressions, not reported here, were also made with the inclusion of variables 
reflecting variance in education, age, population growth, and urbanization between 
states. A number of diflercnt functional forms of the basic cstimating equation wcre also 
tried. The conclusions regarding right-to-work laws and the other prime determinants of 
unionism were not substantively altered by these additions and variations. 





Constant .................... . 
0 0 fcrnale ....... . ........... . 
:\ nonwhite ... " ............. . 
7<, transportation-public utilities 
(~;) mining and Illanufacturing 
(),~ construction ........... ,. 
",[edian wage and salary income .. 
Right-to-work law 
(yes = 1; no = 0) .......... . 











FACTORS AFFECTING UNIONIZATIO>l BY STATE 
1939 19S3 
t Statistic Mean Coefficient t Statistic 
0.612 1.00 8.951 0.539 
-2.889 22.96 -0.695 -1.664 
1.407 10.81 0.268 1.840 
2.679 10.50 0.318 0.48i' 
1.690 32.78 -0.020 -0.119 
-1.951 4.45 -1.972 - 2.2% 
2.912 793.17 0.021 * 5.212 
-1.946 0.40 -4.474* -1.687 
.62 .67 
*One-tailed kst 'ii,~nificant at 
**Tvvo-tailcd \f'st sil,("nificant at (sign opposite that predicted by the Olodeli. 
1968 
!'viean Coefficient t Statistic Mean 
1.00 -2.858 -0.132 1.00 
26.63 -0.435 -0.925 37.52 
9.82 -0.071 -0.073 10.78 
9.37 2.517* 2.954 6.42 
32.50 0.320* 2.747 27.86 
5.94 -2.194** -2.257 5.26 
2110.65 0.006* 4.263 5745.44 
0.40 -3.391* - 1.697 0.40 
.72 
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number of nonunion construction employees. Unfortunately, the data 
required to test that hypothesis are not available. 
As was hypothesized, the coefficient on variable 6, median wage and 
salary income, is positive. In each year the coefficient is highly significant. 
We have implicitly assumed the income variable to be exogenously 
determined. If, however, unions succeed in raising wages, income will be 
endogenous and will be simultaneously determined with degree of 
unionization. As a result, the regression coefficient may be biased. The 
position that income is exogenous may be justifiable, however, on two 
bases. First, previous work, both theoretical and empirical, has not 
suggested a high degree of unionization-high wage causal relationship 
that is significant for many industries over time (see Reder 1958 and 
Lewis 1963). Second, even if unions raise wages in the union sector, it is 
quite possible that wages will be depressed below their market levels in 
nonunion sectors so that the net effect of unionization on the median 
wage is indeterminate. 
The coefficient of the right-to-work variable is negative and statistically 
significant in all 3 years. The 1939 value of the estimated coefficient 
(-4.636) is interpreted as follows. For 1939, in states which would have 
a right-to-work law by 1968, union membership was, on average, 4.64 
percent lower than in states which did not adopt right-to-work laws, 
ceteris jJaribus. Since right-to-work laws did not exist in any state in 1939, 
this significant difference in unioll members is interpreted as being due 
to diffcrences in tastes and preferences for unionization. 
In 19:>3, ill the 19 states that either had right-to-work laws by this time 
or would ha\"(~ them by 1968, the right-to-work variable exerts a 
depressant dl(oct on union membership of 4.47 percent. Since, in 1953, 
13 states had right-In-work laws, the coefJicient for 1953 includes both the 
tastes and preferellces effect of the right-to-work variable, and also any 
impact the actual passage of the law in the 13 states had had up to that 
time. If tastes and preferences are assumed constant from 1939 to 1953, 
then any impact of the passage of right-to-work laws as of 1953 should 
be manifested by a larger coefIicient in 1953 than in 1939. A relevant 
statistical test is Hotclling's T2 test of the difference between two estimated 
coeflicients. Sillce I he 19:'>3 cocilicient is smaller than the 1939 eocilicien t, 
it is not necessary to perfcJrm the formal test. The inJluenee of the right-
to-work variable is slllaller in 19:)3 compared with 1939, not greater as 
would be expected if the laws 11<1\"e a negative effect on union member-
ship. Thus, the hypothesis of no impact of right-to-work laws cannot be 
rejected as nf 1953. 
For 1968, the right-tn-work variable has a coefIicient of - 3.39. This 
is smaller in absolute value than either 1939 or 1953. Subject to the 
caution of comparing the 1968 data with those of the 2 earlier years, we 
again conclude that the hypothesis of no impact of the law cannot be 
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TABLE 4 
FACTORS AFFECTING CHANGES IN UNIONIZATION, 1939-63 
Independent Variable 
Constant ....................... . 
Female ........................ . 
Nonwhite ...................... . 
Transportation-public utili tics .... . 
J'.:1ining and manufacturing ... . 
ConstructIOn ................... . 
Incomc ....................... . 
Right-to-work law .............. . 
R2 ............................ . 
Constant. . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . 
Female .................... . 
l\"onwhitc ............. . 
Transportation-public utilities .... . 
~ining aI?d rnanufacturing ...... . 
ConstructIOn ............ . 
Income ....................... . 
Years in efTect .................. . 
R2 .................... . 


























































rejected. Our general conclusion, therefore, with regard to states which 
have adopted right-to-work laws is that they hold significantly different 
attitudes regarding unionization than do the remainder of the states but 
that no evidence exists of any significant impact on unionization of the 
actual right-to-work laws themselves. 
The second test of the effect of right-to-work laws involve'S the use of 
first differences of the data. The change in unionization between 1939 and 
1968 was regressed as a function of changes in the other variables over 
the same period. The results are summarized in table 4, part A. The 
right-to-work variable is not statistically significantly different from 
zero.3 The only variables that are statistically significant arc the change 
in income and the change in employment in transportation and public 
utilities. Both coefficients are positive, as suggested in section II. 
The third test of the effect of right-to-work laws incorporates a variable 
representing thc number of years a state had a right-to-work law in force 
by 1968. These results are reported in table 4, part B. Using the subset 
of states which had passed such laws by 1968, the first difference data 
were again used. The length of time since passage of a law was not found 
3 Although not explicitly reported here, similar findings held for the subperiods 1963 
minus 1953 and 1953 minus 1939. 
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to be significantly related to the change in union membership. The only 
statistically significant coefficient is that of variable 3, proportion of 
workers engaged in transportation and public utilities. 
IV. SUIllIllary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have attempted to determine the effect of right-to-work 
laws on union membership. It was found that states with such laws have 
a significantly smaller percentage of their work force unionized but that 
the difference reflects tastes and preferences of the population rather than 
a substantive impact of the laws themselves. Analysis of changes in union 
membership in states with and without right-to-work laws and using the 
number of years a law has been in force yielded similar conclusions. Thus, 
we align ourselves with prevailing suspicions that the battle for right-to-
work laws is one of symbol rather than substance. 
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